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ThE PrOsPEcTs fOr a DEMOcraTic PrEsiDEncy in a POsT-9/11 WOrLD
[W]hen I won [the] election in 2008, one of the reasons I think 
that people were excited about the campaign was the prospect that 
we would change how business is done in Washington. and we 
were in such a hurry to get things done that we didn’t change how 
things got done. and I think that frustrated people.
– President Barack Obama1
We’re taking a pragmatic approach to find the best solution to 
national security threats consistent with protection of civil liberties 
and the rule of law. and we’re trying to avoid too many abstract 
front-end rules that limit our options here.
– David Kris, assistant attorney General for national  
Security, U.S. Department of Justice2
I. INTRODUCTION
 Beyond its horrific immediate consequences, the monstrous attacks of September 
11 left behind a poisonous political legacy in the United States. not the least of the 
harms inflicted was an intensification in the Bush administration’s already zealous 
allegiance to presidentialism, a theory of government “that treat[s] our Constitution 
as vesting in the President a fixed and expansive category of executive authority 
largely immune to legislative control or judicial review.”3 Presidentialism operated in 
the Bush administration as more than an abstract philosophy. It functioned as a 
powerful guiding ethos in the behavior of executive branch officials. In both domestic 
and foreign policy—but, most fatefully, I would argue, with regard to military and 
national security policy—members of the Bush administration acted, to borrow Jack 
Goldsmith’s phrase, as “executive power ideologues.”4 In their hands, as I have 
written elsewhere, presidentialism bred “an insularity, defensiveness, and even 
arrogance within the executive branch that undermine[d] sound decisionmaking, 
discount[ed] the rule of law, and attenuate[d] the role of authentic deliberation in 
shaping political outcomes.”5
 the aggressive presidentialism of the Bush-Cheney regime undoubtedly affected 
how many supporters of presidential candidate Barack Obama understood his 2008 
campaign slogan, “Change You Can Believe In.” the change they expected, or at 
1. President Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President (nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president. 
2. Interview by am. Constitution Soc’y Blog with David S. Kris, assistant U.S. att’y Gen. for nat’l Sec., 
in D.C. (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/14425.
3. Peter M. Shane, Madison’s nightmare: how executive Power threatens american 
Democracy 3 (2009).
4. Jack Goldsmith, the terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush administration 
89 (2007).
5. Shane, supra note 3, at 25.
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least hoped for, was a full-throated repudiation of presidentialism as an ideology. In 
2007 then senator Obama had called for “[n]o more ignoring the law when it is 
inconvenient.”6 Many voters no doubt hoped for the replacement of presidentialism 
by an equally robust ideology of governance rooted in ideas like checks and balances, 
public accountability, and the rule of law.
 In May 2009 President Obama seemed to be repaying that hope. In a major 
address at the national archives on national security, he outlined a wide variety of 
measures his administration had taken or was initiating to protect the nation against 
terrorism. he prefaced his review, however, with the following:
I believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we . . . cannot keep 
this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values. 
the documents that we hold in this very hall—the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of rights—these are not simply 
words written into aging parchment. they are the foundation of liberty and 
justice in this country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom, 
fairness, equality, and dignity around the world.
I stand here today as someone whose own life was made possible by these 
documents. My father came to these shores in search of the promise that they 
offered. My mother made me rise before dawn to learn their truths when I 
lived as a child in a foreign land. My own american journey was paved by 
generations of citizens who gave meaning to those simple words—“to form a 
more perfect union.” I’ve studied the Constitution as a student, I’ve taught it 
as a teacher, I’ve been bound by it as a lawyer and a legislator. I took an oath 
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, 
and as a citizen, I know that we must never, ever, turn our back on its enduring 
principles for expedience sake.7
 roughly halfway into his first term, however, President Obama—although 
acknowledging and, in significant ways, advancing those values—does not seem to 
have fully articulated a vision of the presidency that unambiguously turns its back on 
Bush-Cheney presidentialism. Despite genuine achievements, for example, in helping 
to depoliticize the Justice Department and advancing the cause of government 
openness, the “big ideas” guiding his conception of the presidency still seem obscure, 
even to many supporters. Instead of challenging the operating ideology of the Bush 
administration head-on, he has often appeared to offer mainly his pragmatism as his 
chief antidote to Bush-era abuses. By pragmatism, I mean the self-conscious 
preference for “practical” approaches to addressing problems and challenges, in which 
strategies are pursued based on facts, evidence, and structured rational discourse, but 
which are also largely accepting of what decisionmakers regard as existing material 
and political constraints on action. the epigram on national security policy that 
6. Senator Barack Obama, remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center: the War We need to Win (aug. 1, 
2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/obamasp0807.pdf.
7. President Barack Obama, remarks by the President on nat’l Sec. (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter Obama 
nat’l Sec. remarks], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- 
national-security-5-21-09.
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heads this essay, from then assistant attorney general David Kris, seems to capture 
this mood.
 to be sure, as compared to the Bush style of governance, an avowed turn to 
pragmatism may appear to be no small matter. On a host of issues, including many 
that are critically related to U.S. national security in a post-9/11 world, the Bush 
administration often seemed driven by ideology über alles. Conspicuous examples 
include the decision to invade Iraq, the actual manner in which the invasion was 
staged, and the defense of what everyone in the world except the Bush administration 
was ready to call “torture.” these issues and many others looked to be all but 
predetermined by political pre-commitments in a way that seemed oblivious to the 
foreseeable consequences on the ground. Compared to, say, invading Iraq with 
seeming disregard for the inevitably resulting empowerment of Iran, there is much to 
be said for a policymaking approach that actually cares about outcomes.
 a pragmatic approach to policymaking, however, can be coherently interpreted 
only within a substantive set of guiding values. Pursuing “practical strategies” 
energetically, while articulating substantive values only vaguely and occasionally, 
cannot succeed as an enduring antidote to Bush-style presidentialism. It cannot have 
the permeating impact on executive branch behavior that one might seek from a 
comprehensive re-articulation of the presidency based on checks and balances, public 
accountability, and the rule of law. this is so for two related reasons: First, without a 
substantive re-articulation of the presidency, many of the Obama administration’s 
practical responses to particular problems are susceptible to being understood in 
presidentialist terms—and thus, as legitimating presidentialism of even the Bush-
Cheney sort. that is precisely why, despite very genuine differences between the 
Obama and Bush presidencies, President Obama’s national security actions are 
frequently derided (or applauded) as being straightforward continuations of the prior 
administration.8 Second, unless presidential pragmatism is explicitly, even 
emphatically, linked to a set of larger beliefs about the role and nature of the 
presidency, it is unlikely to be an effective program for re-orienting executive branch 
behavior and mobilizing popular support. the actions of both government bureaucrats 
and voters in general are shaped by notions of who they are and the values to which 
they owe allegiance. “Sensible, balanced outcomes” is too thin and indeterminate a 
rallying cry to shape the identity of either citizens or officials in a way likely to 
redirect our political life. this is especially so when the dominant presidentialist 
narrative is so deeply entrenched in other cultural norms.
 What I am suggesting here, of course, is not an abandonment of practicality, or a 
return to rigidly ideological decisionmaking guided by a different ideology. I mean 
instead to underscore the importance for presidential leadership of establishing clearly 
the substantive values that guide the Obama administration’s pragmatism. When the 
administration makes controversial decisions, those decisions ought to be defensible—
and publicly defended—within the terms of those larger values. any hesitancy, 
8. See Glenn Greenwald, Obama’s embrace of Bush terrorism policies is celebrated as “Centrism,” Salon (May, 
19, 2009), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/05/19/obama.
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unwillingness, or inability to tie the administration’s controversial decisions to its 
larger beliefs cannot help but cripple the attempt to position the Obama presidency 
as an effective alternative to the “executive power ideologues” it has succeeded.
 to clarify this argument, Parts II and III of this essay examine the Obama 
administration’s record with regard to two critical areas of national security policy 
that proved deeply problematic after 9/11—the treatment of enemy combatants and 
the scope of government secrecy. In each section, I detail ways in which the Obama 
administration has tried to distance itself from its predecessor. I also recount actions 
that could be read as allowing Bush understandings of executive power to persist and 
explain how the administration seems to be missing, intentionally or not, fairly 
obvious opportunities to articulate a different conception of a post-9/11 presidency. 
In Part IV, I speculate on the reasons for this seeming letdown and set forth what I 
take to be its potential costs to our governance. It would require a much longer 
work—albeit one I hope eventually to complete—to set out the alternative vision of 
executive power that I would wish the administration to embrace. I conclude, 
however, with at least a brief outline of that vision, which I call “the Democratic 
Presidency” and which seems entirely consistent with at least President Obama’s 
general pronouncements about legitimacy and the rule of law.
II.  THE DETENTION, TREATMENT, AND TRIAL OF ENEMY COMBATANTS
 the most heated separation of powers controversies surrounding the Bush 
administration centered on its prosecution of the “War on terror.” at the top of the 
list were Bush administration claims that the President could hold enemy combatants 
at Guantánamo Bay without judicial review of their detention;9 that the President 
could unilaterally interpret the Geneva Conventions as inapplicable to detainees 
captured in afghanistan;10 that, for alleged violations of the laws of war, the executive 
branch could try accused enemy combatants by military commissions without 
observing constitutional rights implicated in ordinary prosecutions;11 and that the 
President could authorize harsh interrogation techniques regardless of either domestic 
or international law banning torture.12
9. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy assistant att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice & John C. Yoo, Deputy assistant att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to William J. haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001), reprinted in the 
torture Papers: the road to abu Ghraib 29 (Karen I. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
10. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy assistant att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, & robert J. Delabunty, Deputy assistant att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to William J. haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in the 
torture Papers, supra note 9, at 38.
11. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, assistant att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to William J. haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 26, 2002), reprinted in the torture 
Papers, supra note 9, at 144.
12. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, assistant att’y Gen., Office of the Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in the torture 
Papers, supra note 9, at 172.
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 the Supreme Court explicitly rebuffed the first three of these positions in a series of 
three cases: Rasul v. Bush,13 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,14 and Boumediene v. Bush.15 In Rasul 
the Court held that the general federal habeas corpus statute16 applied to Guantánamo 
detainees. thus, the petitioners, two australian and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who were 
captured in afghanistan, could all challenge their detention under that statute.17
 Hamdan, a suit brought pursuant to the federal habeas statute, challenged the 
permissibility of trying Guantánamo detainees before military commissions. hamdan 
was a Yemeni national accused of working as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and 
personal driver.18 the Court held that the Geneva Conventions apply to detainees in 
hamdan’s position; that he could enforce their protections through judicial suit; and 
that Guantánamo military commissions as then constituted fell short of standards 
imposed by the Geneva Conventions, as implemented by federal statutes.19 the 
Court further held that military commissions could try defendants only for “war 
crimes” and that the conspiracy charge lodged against hamdan was not a war crime 
as defined either by federal or customary international law.20
 Boumediene, the Supreme Court’s most recent Guantánamo decision, returned to 
the adjudication of enemy combatant status. Congress had reacted to Hamdan by 
enacting the Military Commissions act of 2006 (MCa).21 the MCa provided a 
relatively circumscribed process for reviewing administrative determinations that a 
Guantánamo detainee was, in fact, an enemy combatant. the MCa otherwise 
eliminated habeas access for non-citizens subject to its provisions. Boumediene held 
the MCa’s bar to habeas unconstitutional. the majority concluded that, unless 
enemy combatants have access to habeas review of their detention, the determination 
of enemy combatant status, through a combination of administrative adjudication 
and judicial oversight, has to provide a fully equivalent substitute to habeas in terms 
of assuring a sound factual basis for the detention.22 the MCa scheme fell short.23
13. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
14. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
15. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
17. 542 U.S. at 466, 484.
18. 548 U.S. at 570.
19. Id. at 628–29, 632, 634.
20. Id. at 563 –64.
21. Pub. L. no. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), amended by the Military Commissions act of 2009, Pub. L. 
no. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
22. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008).
23. a fourth important loss for the administration was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a habeas case involving an alleged 
enemy combatant who was also a U.S. citizen, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). the Court confirmed that the 
authorization to Use Military Force, which Congress enacted after September 11, 2001, gave the President 
authority to detain enemy combatants captured in fighting against the taliban and al-Qaeda, irrespective 
of citizenship. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (discussing Pub. L. no. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). It held, 
however, that detention based on alleged enemy combatant status had to be based on administrative 
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 the Supreme Court has not yet been called upon to decide on the fourth of the 
Bush administration’s truly controversial positions—its limited definition of torture 
and its assertion that Congress lacked the power to regulate the President’s power to 
authorize wartime interrogation techniques. the Court’s decisions, however, clearly 
imply a negative response. First, as noted above, Hamdan held the Geneva 
Conventions applicable to detainees in the war against al-Qaeda and the taliban.24 
Moreover, four concurring Justices in Hamdan—Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and 
Ginsburg—specifically wrote, “the Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single 
ground: Congress has not issued the executive a ‘blank check.’”25 this obviously 
implies congressional power to regulate the President’s conduct, and it is doubtful 
that Justice Sotomayor, who succeeded Justice Souter, or Justice Kagan, the successor 
to Hamdan’s author, Justice Stevens, would disagree.
 as of this writing, the ninth Circuit is deciding an appeal from a decision 
allowing former Justice Department attorney John Yoo to be sued for his alleged role 
in sanctioning torture.26 Under then assistant attorney general Jack Goldsmith, the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) actually rescinded the opinions authored by professor 
Yoo that purported to uphold the President’s authority to allow any interrogation 
techniques he thought appropriate, regardless of applicable statutes.27
 On its second day in office, the Obama administration distanced itself from the 
Bush administration’s positions on the Geneva Conventions and interrogation 
techniques and aligned itself explicitly with the Supreme Court’s Guantánamo 
holdings. executive Order 13,491 asserted the appropriateness of the standards 
articulated in the Geneva Conventions’ Common article 3 in guiding the conditions 
of custody for all individuals detained in any armed conflict involving the United 
States.28 It ordered the closing of all secret CIa detention facilities.29 It renounced all 
legal guidance regarding interrogation rendered between September 11, 2001, and 
January 20, 2009.30 a companion order created an interagency task force to conduct
procedures meeting constitutional standards of due process—a holding that prompted the Bush 
administration to create the so-called Combatant Status review tribunals (CSrts) for this purpose. Id.
24. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–29.
25. Id. at 636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (n.D. Cal. 2009).
27. Memorandum for the Files from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy assistant att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan 15, 2009) [hereinafter Bradbury Memo], http://www.
justice.gov/olc/docs/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.
28. exec. Order no. 13,491, § 3(a), 74 Fed. reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009).
29. Id. § 4, at 4894.
30. Id. § 1, at 4893. the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had withdrawn several of the 
relevant opinions under President George W. Bush. Bradbury Memo, supra note 27. OLC withdrew five 
more under President Barack Obama. Memorandum from David J. Barron, acting assistant att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the att’y Gen. (apr. 15, 2009), http://
www.justice.gov/olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf; Memorandum from David J. Barron, 
acting assistant att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the att’y Gen. 
(June 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/memo-barron2009.pdf.
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a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to the Federal 
Government with respect to the apprehension, detention, trial, transfer, 
release, or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in 
connection with armed conf licts and counterterrorism operations, and to 
identify such options as are consistent with the national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice.31
 Yet a third executive order articulated the goal of closing Guantánamo within a 
year32 and set in motion a process to review the status of all remaining Guantánamo 
detainees with an eye toward their transfer to facilities in the United States, 
prosecution, or possible release. this order specifically referred to “all applicable laws 
governing the conditions of . . . confinement, including Common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions.”33 that process yielded a January 2010 task Force report 
concerning the 240 then detainees at Guantánamo; 156 were found appropriate for 
transfer to countries outside the United States, and 36 remained under active 
investigation for possible prosecution.34 that left only 48 detainees in de facto 
“prisoner of war” status, i.e., “too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for 
prosecution.”35
 On the use of military commissions, President Obama waited until May 2009 
before publicly stating that such commissions “are appropriate for trying enemies 
who violate the laws of war, provided that they are properly structured and 
administered.”36 In taking that stance, however, he indicated five respects in which 
he felt the version of military commissions offered by the Bush administration was 
inadequate.37 Following the President’s statement, then secretary of defense robert 
M. Gates amended military commission procedures to (1) prohibit the admission of 
statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (2) give 
detainees greater latitude in their choice of counsel; (3) afford protection for those 
defendants who refuse to testify; (4) place the burden of justification for using hearsay 
on the party trying to use it; and (5) confirm that military judges are empowered to 
31. exec. Order no. 13,493, § 1(e), 74 Fed. reg. 4901, 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009).
32. exec. Order no. 13,492, § 3, 74 Fed. reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).
33. Id. § 6, at 4899.
34. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., Final report of the Guantánamo review task Force, at ii 
(2010), http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. Of the 156 detainees found 
appropriate for transfer to countries outside the United States, “30 detainees from Yemen were designated 
for ‘conditional’ detention based on the current security environment in that country. they are not 
approved for repatriation to Yemen at this time, but they may be transferred to third countries, or 
repatriated to Yemen in the future . . . .” Id.
35. Id.
36. President Barack Obama, Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 
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determine their own jurisdiction.38 In October 2009 President Obama signed into 
law the Military Commissions act of 2009,39 which made all five changes statutory.
 In all of these respects, therefore—acknowledging the availability of habeas 
review, applying the Geneva Conventions to all military detainees, renouncing the 
use of harsh interrogation techniques, and increasing the procedural protections 
entailed in military commissions—the Obama administration embraced positions 
that the Bush administration initially resisted. attorney General eric holder further 
asserted the appropriateness of trying terrorist suspects, whenever possible, in article 
III federal courts, pushing back against political pressure to try all alleged enemy 
combatants exclusively in military venues.40 Subjecting terrorists to prosecution and 
punishment within the ordinary criminal justice system is itself a form of allegiance 
to the rule of law. these are not small matters. and, in announcing these policy 
changes, President Obama adverted explicitly, albeit summarily, to critical values 
such as “the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in United States 
custody,”41 “the interests of justice,”42 and “the rule of law.”43
 Yet, none of the relevant documents or accompanying presidential statements 
offers any critique of the Bush theories of presidential authority that underpinned the 
earlier administration’s stance on habeas corpus, military commissions, or the 
interrogation and confinement of alleged enemy combatants. there has not been a 
statement elaborating on what the President takes to be the demands of the “rule of 
law” regarding the exercise of executive authority, or the ways in which “our deeply 
held values” will be balanced against america’s “national security interests.”
 In the absence of such statements, there stand several conspicuous points of 
operational continuity between Bush and Obama policy that please Bush supporters 
and trouble Bush critics: the detention of alleged enemy combatants without any 
legal protections at Bagram air Force Base in afghanistan,44 the continued use of 
military commissions for trying enemy combatants for war crimes,45 and the indefinite 
incarceration of at least some military detainees without trial.46 there also has 
emerged a controversy, not raised to public attention during the Bush administration, 
38. Id.; Jennifer K. elsea, Cong. research Serv., r 41163, the Military Commissions act of 
2009: Overview of Legal Issues 3 (2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/r41163.pdf.
39. Military Commissions act of 2009, Pub. L. no. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
40. eric holder, attorney General eric holder Speaks at the U.S. Constitution Project awards Dinner 
(apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-1004152.html.
41. exec. Order no. 13,491, supra note 28, at 4893.
42. exec. Order no. 13,492, supra note 32, at 4897.
43. Obama nat’l Sec. remarks, supra note 7.
44. William Fisher, Bagram’s “New” Rules. So What’s New?, huffington Post (Sept. 14, 2009), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/william-fisher/bagrams-new-rules-so-what_b_285638.html.
45. Peter Finn, Detainee Khadr Pleads Guilty, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 2010, at a06, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/25/ar2010102505473.html.
46. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., supra note 34, at 12.
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that has plainly vexed progressive critics of President Obama’s predecessor: whether 
(and in what form) the President is bound by constitutional requirements of due 
process before consigning a U.S. citizen to a CIa “kill-or-capture” list. this 
particular controversy over targeted killing arose after the Los Angeles Times reported 
in april 2010 that the Obama administration had authorized the capture or killing 
of anwar al-aulaqi,47 a Muslim cleric born in new Mexico to Yemeni parents.48
 al-aulaqi’s father subsequently brought suit, as his son’s putative “next friend,” 
seeking to enjoin the intentional killing of his son outside an armed conflict, unless 
he poses an imminent threat to life or physical safety and no less draconian measures 
are available to neutralize his threat.49 In its opposition brief, the administration 
characterizes al-aulaqi as follows:
anwar al-aulaqi is a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen and a leader of al-Qaeda in the 
arabian Peninsula (aQaP), a Yemen-based terrorist group that has claimed 
responsibility for numerous armed terrorist attacks against american, Saudi 
arabian, Korean and Yemeni targets since January 2009. [he] has recruited 
individuals to join aQaP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support 
of acts of terrorism, and helped focus aQaP’s attention on attacking U.S. 
interests. In addition, since late 2009, anwar al-aulaqi has taken on an 
increasingly operational role in aQaP, including preparing Umar Farouk 
abdulmutallab in his attempt to detonate an explosive device aboard a 
northwest airlines f light from amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 
2009. the United States has further determined that aQaP is an organized 
armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or 
cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against the United 
States in the noninternational armed conflict between the United States and 
al-Qaeda that the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.50
these facts appear to be uncontradicted. the Obama administration urged dismissal 
of the suit on a variety of grounds, including the father’s alleged lack of standing, the 
nonjusticiability of the questions posed, the court’s equitable discretion to deny relief, 
and the lack of a cause of action under the alien tort Statute.51 the administration 
also asserted, as a final ground for dismissing the suit—a ground it explicitly and 
successfully urged the Court not to reach—that litigating the father’s claim would 
47. In both official documents and journalistic accounts, “aulaqi” is variously spelled “aulaqi,” “awlaqi,” 
and “awlaki.” I am using “aulaqi,” as ref lected in court documents, except where quoting from a text 
that uses a different spelling.
48. David S. Cloud, Awlaki is Added to CIA Target List, L.a. times, apr. 7, 2010, at 8, available at http://
articles.latimes/com/2010/apr/06/world/la-fg/yemen-cleric7-2010apr07.
49. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 1, 10, al-aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (no. 10-cv-1469), 2010 WL 3555385, at *2, *6. 
50. Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, al-aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (no. 10-cv-
1469), 2010 WL 3863135, at *2.
51. Id. at 9–42.
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entail the disclosure of information protected by the state secrets privilege.52 not 
surprisingly, upon the filing of the government’s brief, the New York Times headline 
read: “State Secrets Cited in effort by White house to Block Suit.”53 a widely read 
progressive reporter summarized the oral argument as follows: “Lawyers for the 
Barack Obama administration told a federal judge . . . that the U.S. government has 
authority to kill U.S. citizens whom the executive branch has unilaterally determined 
pose a threat to national security.”54
 It is not difficult to imagine why anwar al-aulaqi would be targeted for a kill-
or-capture list. What seems striking, however—especially in light of the campaign 
theme of “change”—is the administration’s apparent decision not to discuss in any 
detail its operating standards, its decisionmaking processes, or their application to 
al-aulaqi. Outside the litigation, the administration’s sole public stance seems to 
have been articulated in a briefing with then White house press secretary robert 
Gibbs. It is worth considering the exchange as a whole, in order to see why the 
administration’s critics see so little change from the Bush administration:
Q: human rights lawyers are challenging the administration’s assertion that 
an american citizen can be targeted for killing overseas. Should americans 
worry that if they go overseas, their own government could target them to be 
killed? anwar al-awlaki is the person in question, but the legal principle—
Mr. GIBBS: Okay, let’s—let me just for the point of—I don’t know what I 
would make—I think you just largely said a tourist going overseas and anwar 
al-awlaki are somehow analogous in nature. I’m not a—
Q: But if the U.S. decides that an american citizen is affiliated with a terrorist 
group—
Mr. GIBBS: no, no, let’s be clear, let’s be—no, no, let’s be clear.
Q: Is there any legal process?
Mr. GIBBS: Let’s be clear about anwar al-awlaki, okay? the United States 
hasn’t decided that anwar al-awlaki is aligned with a terrorist group. anwar 
al-awlaki has in videos cast his lot with al Qaeda and its extremist allies. 
anwar al-awlaki is acting as a regional commander for al Qaeda in the 
arabian Peninsula. So let’s not take a tourist that might visit Italy overseas 
and equate him to somebody who has on countless times in video pledged to 
uphold and support the violent and murderous theories of al Qaeda. there—
Q: the U.S. has mistakenly identified people as terrorists in many instances 
in the last eight years, and if americans can be targeted for killing—
52. Id. at 43–59.
53. Charlie Savage, State Secrets Cited in Effort by White House to Block Suit, n.Y. times, Sept. 25, 2010 at 7, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/25awlaki.html.
54. William Fisher, Obama Lawyers Defend “Kill Lists,” Inter Press Service news agency (nov. 9, 
2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53508.
38
ThE PrOsPEcTs fOr a DEMOcraTic PrEsiDEncy in a POsT-9/11 WOrLD
Mr. GIBBS: ari, it’s hard to imagine an issue in which two things have been 
conf lated more than your question in the past 18 months of me taking 
questions here. I think the notion that somehow anybody in this country 
confuses traveling overseas and the role that anwar al-awlaki has in inciting 
violence—they’re not even in the same ballpark.
Q: are you acknowledging that awlaki is on the assassination list, then?
Mr. GIBBS: I just answered his question about comparing Joe the tourist to 
anwar al-awlaki.
Q: Just a quick follow to that. U.S. citizens are entitled to a certain judicial 
process when it comes to questions like this, when it comes to sentencing to 
death. and is there a process in place that we don’t know about?
Mr. GIBBS: there’s a process in place that I’m not at liberty to discuss.
. . . .
Q: [t]here is a lawsuit that the Center for Constitutional rights and the 
aCLU is bringing today regarding the policies or lack—perceived lack of 
policies as they relate to Mr. al-awlaki. and what I wanted to ask is—I mean, 
you just told us there is a process in place that you’re not at liberty to discuss. 
Is that going to be the government’s position, or are you going to disclose 
what the policy is? Do you think there’s any merit to this lawsuit?
Mr. GIBBS: Well, look, again, there is—I’m just not at liberty to discuss 
intelligence matters, Margaret. I would say—I will repeat that anwar 
al-awlaki is someone who has sworn allegiance to al Qaeda in the arabian 
Peninsula, is a regional commander for that group in Yemen, has and 
continues to direct attacks there and, as we know, against innocent men, 
women and children in this country. and this President will take the steps 
necessary to keep our country safe from thugs like him.
Q: I understand that. But the President is also a lawyer with constitutional 
law training. he made clear during the campaign that sort of dotting the i’s 
and crossing the t’s mattered, even if you’re going after bad guys.
Mr. GIBBS: and I think it’s safe to assume that if—without getting deep 
into this—the President understands the process and the President will do all 
that is necessary to keep this country safe from people like him.55
 to his credit, Mr. Gibbs nowhere says that the President has inherent 
constitutional authority to kill at-will any american whom the President perceives to 
be a threat to national security. But note how the press secretary dodges the substance 
of every question. the reporter asks about the administration’s position regarding 
americans who “go overseas.” Gibbs limits the question to “tourists,” and then 
55. Press Briefing by Press Sec’y robert Gibbs (aug. 3, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-832010.
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belittles the hypothetical. he says he cannot discuss the relevant decisionmaking 
process, but that Mr. Obama “understands the process,” and that the President “will 
do all that is necessary” to protect the United States against al-aulaqi and his ilk. he 
simply refuses to engage the question whether there is any tension between the 
handling of the al-aulaqi matter and the President’s campaign stance. to anyone 
critical of Bush administration positions on presidential authority, the Gibbs 
defense—and, to some extent, even the more carefully argued administration position 
urged in the al-aulaqi case—seem to echo the President’s post-midterm 
acknowledgment, quoted above: “[W]e were in such a hurry to get things done that 
we didn’t change how things got done.”
 By way of contrast, as a “thought experiment,” imagine an administration that 
explains the principles behind its decisionmaking in a way that clarifies the 
administration’s allegiance to the rule of law:
Following September 11, Congress authorized the President to use “all 
necessary and appropriate force” against those organizations that “committed . . . 
the [September 11] terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such . . . organizations.”56 
anwar al-aulaqi is a leader of al-Qaeda in the arabian Peninsula (aQaP), 
an organized armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda, or an associated 
force, or cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against 
the United States. From the evidence available to us, there is no doubt that 
Mr. al-aulaqi, if physically present in the United States, would be subject to 
lawful apprehension by federal authorities. the problem is, he is not in the 
United States. therefore, the tools available to us of “necessary and appropriate 
force” to mitigate the threat of attacks on the United States by Mr. al-aulaqi 
are not the tools of ordinary law enforcement.
the Constitution prohibits this government from depriving any person of life 
or liberty without due process. as an american citizen, Mr. al-aulaqi enjoys 
this protection, wherever he may be. the Supreme Court has stated, however, 
that due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances.”57 Without confirming or denying any 
decision that has been made with regard to Mr. al-aulaqi, what we believe 
due process requires in cases like his is a course of fact-finding within the 
executive branch that is exceptional in its rigor and intensity. Congress having 
created no judicial review process for cases such as this, we proceed on our 
own initiative. In exercising that initiative, we proceed based only on evidence 
as compelling as the seriousness of our contemplated action may warrant.
 In just two hypothetical paragraphs, the administration could make clear five 
things that Mr. Gibbs’s response either obfuscates or ignores. First, the President is 
proceeding based on statutory authority. Second, the executive branch distinguishes 
between americans abroad and americans on home territory. third, due process 
applies to Mr. al-aulaqi. Fourth, the executive branch does not seek judicial review 
56. authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
57. Mathews v. eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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of its determinations to use force because no such review is available. (the President 
would not have to say in what circumstances, if any, he thinks Congress could or 
should constitutionally authorize such review.) Fifth, the executive regards itself as 
constitutionally bound to follow a fact-finding process of utmost care in dealing with 
the use of potentially fatal force against a U.S. citizen, even one who has taken up 
arms against the United States. although I have no inside knowledge, I am confident 
that the positions I have posited here are actually aligned with most of the 
administration’s legal thinking. thus, failing to articulate something like the script I 
have imagined strikes me as a perfect example of what looks like the Obama 
administration’s hesitancy, unwillingness, or inability to tie controversial decisions to 
its larger beliefs—in this case, beliefs in due process, the rule of law, and checks and 
balances in the management of national security. the absence of such a statement 
creates ambiguity about the administration’s stance on presidentialism that some 
critics, otherwise politically sympathetic to the administration, understandably 
bemoan.
III. GOVERNMENT SECRECY
 another manifestation of the Bush administration’s belief in the President’s 
narrow accountability was its frequent insistence on secrecy. For fiscal years 2002 
through 2004, there were dramatic increases in the number of pages of classified 
documents and corresponding decreases in the number of pages declassified.58 Large 
numbers of documents and databases were removed from government websites.59 
there was a notable jump in refusals to disclose records requested by members of the 
public under the Freedom of Information act (FOIa), even though the number of 
times agencies relied on national security exemptions to FOIa dropped.60 Former 
vice president Dick Cheney litigated relentlessly to fend off public disclosure of who 
in the oil industry had met with his task force to develop the administration’s 
legislative proposals on energy.61 Perhaps oddest of all was a november 1, 2001, 
executive order concerning the government’s handling of presidential records from 
prior administrations—an order that, among other things, purported to allow the 
family of a disabled former President to choose a personal representative who might 
claim executive privilege in the name of that President,62 a claim that the order 
supposedly made binding on the national archivist regardless of the views of the 
incumbent President.63
58. Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2005 report to the President 13 (2006), http://www.archives.gov/
isoo/reports/2005-annual-report.pdf.
59. John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, in a Little Knowledge: Privacy, Security and 
Public Information after September 11, at 11, 13–14 (Peter M. Shane, et al. eds., 2004).
60. See Coal. of Journalists for Open Gov’t, Federal Government Continues to Fall Behind In 
responding to FOIa requests, CJOG Finds 1–3 (2006), http://www.cjog.net/documents/.pdf.
61. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 372 (2004).
62. exec. Order no. 13,233, § 10, 66 Fed. reg. 56,025, 56,028 (nov. 1, 2001).
63. Id. § 3(d)(1) at 56,026–27.
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 as it did with regard to Guantánamo, the Obama administration took a number 
of early steps to distance itself in both philosophy and practice from the Bush 
administration in relation to releasing information. On his first full day in office, 
President Obama devoted his first executive order to rescinding the Bush executive 
order on the control of records from prior administrations and replacing it with a 
system far less aggressive in its accommodation of executive privilege claims.64 he 
likewise issued a memorandum pledging “an unprecedented level of openness in 
Government.”65 the memo
direct[s] the Chief technology Officer, in coordination with the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the administrator of 
General Services, to coordinate the development by appropriate executive 
departments and agencies, within 120 days, of recommendations for an Open 
Government Directive, to be issued by the Director of OMB, that instructs 
executive departments and agencies to take specific actions implementing the 
principles set forth in this memorandum.66
a presidential memorandum on FOIa implementation, also issued on January 21, 
2009, announced the policy position: “all agencies should adopt a presumption in 
favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied 
in [the] FOIa, and to usher in a new era of open Government. the presumption of 
disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving FOIa.”67 President Obama 
directed “the attorney General to issue new guidelines governing the FOIa to the 
heads of executive departments and agencies, reaffirming the commitment to 
accountability and transparency, and to publish such guidelines in the Federal 
Register.”68 On March 19, 2009, attorney General holder issued his directive. he 
rescinded a 2001 policy promulgated by former attorney general John ashcroft that 
committed the Department of Justice (DOJ) in almost all cases to defend decisions 
to withhold records if supported by a “sound legal basis.”69 It provided, instead, that 
the DOJ would “defend a denial of a FOIa request only if (1) the agency reasonably 
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory 
exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law.”70 the requirement of actual harm 
64. exec. Order no. 13,489, § 4, 74 Fed. reg. 4669, 4670 (Jan. 21, 2009).
65. Memorandum on transparency & Open Gov’t from the President to the heads of exec. Dep’ts & 
agencies, 74 Fed. reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
66. Id.
67. Memorandum on Freedom of Info. act from the President for the heads of exec. Dep’ts & agencies, 
74 Fed. reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
68. Id.
69. Memorandum from att’y Gen. eric holder, Dep’t of Justice, to the heads of exec. Dep’ts & agencies 
1–2 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf.
70. Id. at 2.
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aligned the holder Justice Department’s FOIa policy with those of the Carter and 
Clinton administrations.71
 there’s no doubt that these position shifts have been accompanied by at least 
some important concrete actions that distance the Obama administration from the 
Bush administration. In February 2009 the Obama Defense Department lifted the 
ban on photographing the coffins of returning war dead from Iraq and afghanistan.72 
In September 2009 the White house agreed to post its visitor logs online, containing 
information on all but a few narrow categories of visitors to the President or Vice 
President.73 In December 2009 President Obama issued an executive order that not 
only shifted the standards for handling national security information in the direction 
of greater access, but also created a national Declassification Center in the national 
archives.74 the Center’s mandate is to achieve by December 31, 2013, public access 
to all properly declassified records within a backlog of over 400 million pages of 
records that have been withheld so far from automatic declassification.75 In January 
2010 the administration released the names of detainees at the Bagram air Force 
Base in afghanistan.76
 In late 2009, intelligence agencies also began to disgorge records that the 
electronic Freedom Foundation had requested from the Bush administration 
documenting agency misconduct. these encompassed, for example, a Defense 
Department document release including
a report that the Joint Forces Command, working with the FBI, improperly 
collected and disseminated intelligence on Planned Parenthood and a white 
supremacist group called the national alliance, as part of preparations for 
the 2002 Olympics.
a north american aerospace Defense Command (nOraD) briefing 
improperly included intelligence on an antiwar group called alaskans for 
Peace and Justice in 2005 . . . .
a report from 2003 of a closed investigation into prisoner abuse at abu 
Ghraib and other sites in Iraq . . . . [and]
71. See Jerry L. Mashaw, richard a. Merrill & Peter M. Shane, administrative Law: the 
american Public Law System 768 (6th ed. 2009).
72. Martin Sieff, Photo ban on Iraq war dead lifted, UPI.com (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.upi.com/news/
issueoftheday/2009/02/27/Photo-ban-on-Iraq-war-dead-lifted/UPI-33241235755703.
73. White House Voluntary Disclosure Policy: Visitor Access Records, Whitehouse.gov (Sept. 4, 2009), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/VoluntaryDisclosure. 
74. exec. Order no. 13,526, § 3.7, 75 Fed. reg. 707, 719 (Dec. 29, 2009).
75. Memorandum on Implementation of the exec. Order, “Classified nat’l Sec. Info.,” from the President 
to the heads of exec. Dep’ts & agencies, 75 Fed. reg. 733 (Dec. 29, 2009).
76. alissa J. rubin & Sangar rahimi, U.S. Military Names 645 Detainees Held at Key Afghanistan Base, n.Y. 
times, Jan. 16, 2010, at a6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/asia/17afghan.
html.
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a 2008 report that army Signals Intelligence in Louisiana intercepted 
civilian cell phone conversations.77
Such initiatives were all taken in addition to a variety of ambitious government-wide 
transparency measures implementing the Office of Management and Budget’s Open 
Government Directive, which was finally issued on December 8, 2009.78
 In September 2009 the administration adopted a new policy and set of procedures 
aimed at limiting both the invocation of the so-called state secrets privilege and the 
consequences for public accountability when the privilege is invoked. Specifically, 
under a new Justice Department policy, the attorney general committed the Justice 
Department to invoking the privilege to prevent only “significant” harm to national 
security.79 he pledged that the privilege would not be invoked to conceal violations 
of law or merely embarrassing behavior.80 Should any agency wish the privilege to be 
invoked on its behalf, it must now provide to the Justice Department a detailed 
justification, which, in turn, must be endorsed by the assistant attorney general 
(aaG) in charge of the relevant litigating division. Should the aaG recommend 
invocation, that recommendation would be reviewed by a newly constituted State 
Secrets review Committee, whose recommendation, in turn, would go to the deputy 
attorney general and, if approved, to the attorney general. the privilege is not to be 
invoked without the attorney general’s sign-off. the attorney general, if he or she 
invokes the privilege, is to report the matter to the relevant agency inspector general 
should the attorney general find plausible the underlying assertions of wrongdoing.
 Despite the new procedure, however, the administration has persisted in invoking 
the state secrets privilege in litigation aimed at establishing accountability for alleged 
violations of law by the Bush administration. Prior to the elaboration of the attorney 
general’s new policy, the holder Justice Department had already invoked the state 
secrets privilege to secure the dismissal of suits related to the Bush administration’s 
extraordinary renditions81 and the terrorist Surveillance Program (tSP)82—the 
program of warrantless electronic surveillance conducted by the nSa in apparent 
defiance of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act.83 even with the new policy in 
place, the administration has continued to invoke the privilege in new tSP-related 
77. William Fisher, DoD Releases Records of Illegal Surveillance, truth-Out (Mar. 3, 2010), http://archive.
truthout.org/dod-releases-records-illegal-surveillance57329.
78. Memorandum from Peter r. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the heads of exec. Dep’ts & 
agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.
79. Memorandum from att’y Gen. eric holder, Dep’t of Justice, to heads of exec. Dep’ts & agencies 1 
(Sept. 23, 2009), www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
82. See, e.g., In re nat’l Sec. agency telecomm. records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (n.D. Cal. 2010); see 
also al-haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. Sep 07, 2006), rev’d, 507 
F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007), on remand to sub nom, In re nat’l Sec. agency telecomm. records Litig., 564 
F. Supp. 2d 1109 (n.D. Cal. 2008).
83. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. IV 2010).
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litigation.84 this stance is all the more notable, of course, because candidate Obama 
was critical of the terrorist Surveillance Program,85 and President Obama, early on, 
directed an end to the practice of extraordinary rendition.86 In stymying litigation 
involving extraordinary renditions and the tSP, the Obama administration appears 
to be thwarting the very value of government accountability that it adopted with 
much fanfare as its operating watchword.
 as with its conduct on the substantive aspects of antiterrorism policy, we see 
again a seeming reluctance by the Obama administration to connect its stance on 
state secrets with larger ideas about executive power and public accountability. to be 
sure, the holder September 2009 policy statement seeks to place state secrets 
determinations within a sensible values framework. It foreswears use of the privilege 
to protect information unless the release of that information would work significant 
harm to national security.87 It promises to use the privilege as the basis for seeking 
dismissal of a case or claim only when continued pursuit of the case or claim would 
portend such harm. the policy gestures towards accountability by committing the 
attorney general to seek inspector general investigations of any claims raised, which—
although opposed in court on state secrets grounds—nonetheless raise “credible 
allegations of government wrongdoing.”88 Unfortunately, in terms of distancing the 
Obama administration from the Bush administration’s excesses, there is no way of 
knowing whether this policy makes any operational difference at all.
 Of course, it is possible that the policy is doing just the job it should. For all we 
know, when the state secrets privilege has been invoked by the Obama administration, 
the government lawyers involved, including the attorney general, may have been 
appropriately persuaded by their client agencies that the disclosure of the disputed 
material would, indeed, work significant harm to the national security or foreign 
policy interests of the United States. For all we know, the process outlined has led to 
the rejection of some potential state secrets claims that would have been raised by 
other administrations. For all we know, it may even be that the policy has resulted in 
internal investigations that are rooting out government wrongdoing. the problem is, 
of course, that we know nothing. the Obama administration has not made a public 
case for any of this—a silence that continues to fuel claims on both the left and right 
that, on matters of government secrecy in the national security area, there is no 
meaningful difference between the Obama administration and its predecessor.
84. Justin elliott, Obama Adopts Bush’s State Secrets Position—And Exact Language—In NSA Spying Case, 
talking Points Memo (nov. 2, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/ 
2009/11/obama_adopts_bushs_state_secrets_position_--_and_e.php.
85. anne Broache, Obama: No warrantless wiretaps if you elect me, Cnet news (Jan. 8, 2008, 1:16 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9845595-7.html.
86. exec. Order no. 13,491, 74 Fed. reg. 4893, 4895 (2009).
87. Memorandum from att’y Gen. eric holder, Dep’t of Justice, to the heads of exec. Dep’ts & agencies, 
supra note 79, at 1.
88. Id. at 3.
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 Indeed, in the public mind—and certainly, in the mind of its critics—the proper 
frame for understanding the administration’s stance on state secrets is not its 
assertedly robust commitment to openness in other contexts, but rather its apparent 
unwillingness to hold anyone accountable for the abuses of the Bush administration. 
thus, for example, the administration has declined to pursue discipline against 
Justice Department attorneys who provided written advice “riddled with weird 
arguments, cherry-picked quotations, and inexplicable omissions,”89 which provided 
legal cover for torture.90 It has declined to prosecute CIa personnel who destroyed 
videotapes showing the CIa’s interrogation of al-Qaeda members.91 It has resisted 
the idea of an independent commission to look broadly at the rule of law under the 
Bush administration.92 It has even opposed a FOIa suit aimed at obtaining the 
names of lobbyists who met with government officials to push for a grant of legislative 
immunity for telecommunications companies that collaborated with the Bush 
administration in warrantless electronic surveillance in violation of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance act.93 In the meantime, other nations have exercised the 
initiative to apologize and compensate their citizens for harms they suffered due to 
Bush administration policies.94
89. David Luban, David Margolis is Wrong, Slate (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:49 aM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2245531/pagenum/all.
90. See Memorandum from David Margolis, assoc. Deputy att’y Gen., to the att’y Gen. & Deputy att’y 
Gen. 3 ( Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Margolis Memo], http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DaGMargolisMemo100105.pdf.
91. Carrie Johnson, No Charges in Destruction of CIA Interrogation Tapes, nPr (nov. 9, 2010), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=131184938.
92. I know that these debates [about actions of the Bush administration] lead directly, in some 
cases, to a call for a fuller accounting, perhaps through an independent commission.
I’ve opposed the creation of such a commission because I believe that our existing 
democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability. the Congress can 
review abuses of our values, and there are ongoing inquiries by the Congress into matters 
like enhanced interrogation techniques. the Department of Justice and our courts can 
work through and punish any violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice.
It’s no secret there is a tendency in Washington to spend our time pointing fingers at 
one another. and it’s no secret that our media culture feeds the impulse that lead[s] to 
a good fight and good copy. But nothing will contribute more than that than a extended 
relitigation of the last eight years. already, we’ve seen how that kind of effort only leads 
those in Washington to different sides to laying blame. It can distract us from focusing 
our time, our efforts, and our politics on the challenges of the future.
 Obama nat’l Sec. remarks, supra note 7, at 10–11.
93. elec. Frontier Found. v. Office of the Dir. of nat’l Intelligence, 595 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2010), amended 
by 639 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. apr. 9, 2010).
94. William Fisher, Britain to Settle Rendition, Torture Case for Millions, Inter Press Service news 
agency (nov. 16, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53576; Doug Struck, Tortured Man Gets 
Apology from Canada, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2007, at a14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/26/ar2007012601717.html.
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 It has been reported that attorney General holder is not himself entirely pleased 
with this record.95 he appointed a special counsel to look into possible acts of torture 
directed at U.S. detainees96—albeit excluding any cases where interrogation 
techniques were consistent with the Justice Department’s earlier legal advice.97 It is 
not clear, however, that the attorney General enjoys White house support for even 
this modest initiative. Perhaps referring to President Obama’s remarks resisting 
investigation by an independent commission,98 former White house chief of staff 
rahm emanuel is reported to have reacted: “Didn’t [holder] get the memo that 
we’re not re-litigating the past?”99 the problem with this reaction, however, is that 
significant aspects of the past have never been litigated at all, much less re-litigated. 
attempting to clean up prior abuses without any clear record of what they were, who 
committed them, or why they actually amounted to abuses under the law, leaves 
intact and unchallenged the historical precedent set by the prior administration’s 
abuse of power.
 Following revelations of massive, illegal domestic intelligence operations during 
the nixon administration, the United States had the benefit of high-level investigations 
by the rockefeller Commission, appointed by President Gerald Ford, and by the 
house and the Senate, chaired by representative Otis Pike and Senator Frank 
Church, respectively.100 the exhaustive report of the Church Committee101 is credited 
with lending impetus to both the reorganization of intelligence oversight in Congress 
and eventual enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act. Perhaps even 
more importantly, it created a historical record that americans thereafter could rely 
on as a basis for democratic debate about national security and intelligence gathering. 
It represented checks and balances at their best.
 By contrast, in the wake of the Bush administration, we largely have obscurity 
and evasion with regard to both the conduct of torture and the massive, unlawful 
disregard of the law on electronic surveillance. Professor David Cole thus sees the 
95. See Wil S. hylton, Hope. Change. Reality., GQ , Dec. 2010, at 180, available at http://www.gq.com/
news-politics/politics/201012/eric-holder-attorney-general-rahm-emanuel-white-house-elections; Jane 
Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the new Yorker, Feb. 15, 
2010, at 52, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215fa_fact_mayer.
96. Carrie Johnson, Prosecutor to Probe CIA Interrogations, Wash. Post, aug. 25, 2009, at a05, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/24/ar2009082401743.html.
97. hylton, supra note 95, at 188.
98. Obama nat’l Sec. remarks, supra note 7, at 11.
99. Mayer, supra note 95.
100. Peter M. Shane & harold h. Bruff, Separation of Powers Law: Cases and Materials 737 –
40 (3d ed. 2011).
101. Final report of the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with 
respect to Intelligence activities, S. rep. no. 94-755 (1976).
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Obama administration as complicit in “our collective failure to confront the wrongs 
of the past.”102 In Cole’s words:
as long as we fail to look back, . . . the future of our policies regarding “enemy 
combatants” . . . will continue to be tainted, encased in soundproof glass, a 
secret hidden from no one but ourselves. Successfully restoring the rule of law 
in our struggle against terrorism may not require the release of all detainees 
held without criminal conviction, but it does require accountability for the 
crimes committed by some of the United States’ highest officials.103
In its handling of state secrets, as with its handling of other aspects of national 
security policy, the administration seems to be missing opportunities to re-articulate 
the role of the federal executive in a post-9/11 world.
IV.  PRAGMATISM AND NARRATIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY IN THE WAKE OF 
SEPTEMBER 11
 the Obama administration began with a number of express statements of 
philosophical disagreement with how the Bush administration exercised executive 
power. Its record reinforces this rhetorical distance from the Bush administration 
with some important changes in government behavior, but it also reveals a number of 
continuing, controversial operations in what seems like the Bush mode. these points 
of continuity, whether the continued use of military commissions or the continued 
invocation of the state secrets privilege to ward off judicial inquiries into torture and 
warrantless surveillance, cannot help but cast doubt on the significance of the rhetoric 
and dishearten the President’s political supporters. they also risk implicitly ratifying 
the ideology of governance that reigned during the Bush-Cheney administration.
 this state of affairs is not inevitable. Differences between the two administrations’ 
philosophies are undoubtedly most conspicuous when the Obama administration 
makes operational decisions plainly at odds with the likely approach of the Bush 
administration. But it may well be the case that specific decisions made by the 
Obama administration—even when identical to decisions that would have been made 
by the Bush administration—could be justified even under theories of executive 
power and the rule of law that differ substantially from those of President Obama’s 
predecessor. What is missing is what Yale literature professor David Bromwich has 
called “the middle layer of explanation” in politics:104 “this is the level at which one 
must articulate the reasons for a policy, along with the understanding of the public 
good from which the policy has issued and the historical context that makes it 
necessary and desirable.”105 Individual Obama administration decisions may well be 
defensible along these lines, but that defense cannot be merely implicit. It must be 
102. David Cole, What to Do About Guantánamo?, n.Y. rev. of Books (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/what-do-about-guantanamo.
103. Id.
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reiterated on many more occasions than a single speech five months into the 
presidency.
 Why has the Obama administration not done this? there are, I imagine, at least 
three reasons. the first is a chronic institutional reluctance within the executive 
branch to suggest limits or to support constraints on its powers. this is not 
invariable—Presidents Ford and Carter both supported congressional regulation of 
presidential records in the wake of Watergate,106 and President James Carter supported 
both the ethics in Government act of 1978107 and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance act. But where Presidents perceive that they are likely be judged on 
accomplishment, there would be an understandable reluctance to risk limiting their 
own (or their successors’) sphere of potential action. In the case of President Obama—
who is facing enormous problems on both the domestic and international fronts, as 
well as a divided government—this risk may seem particularly unwelcome. and, 
especially in the national security sphere, I suspect that there are many career 
personnel in the executive branch who would actually embrace Bush-style 
presidentialism as a matter of principle and so would not counsel any form of 
presidential modesty about executive power.
 the second is politics. With the country still grappling with the effects of a 
devastating recession, as well as the need for pressing action on healthcare, climate 
change, and immigration, the President might well want to avoid the appearance of 
diluting his focus. Moreover, since the Johnson administration, republicans have 
consistently—and with some success—cowed the Democrats by portraying them as 
soft on national security issues. the partisan pushback against any Obama 
administration effort to reinvigorate the rule of law in the national security context is 
likely to be vicious, threatening to erode whatever modicum of goodwill might 
otherwise be available to accomplish seemingly more concrete and immediate 
objectives. this, of course, is not hypothetical. We can see it in republican efforts to 
derail the closing of Guantánamo and in proposals to prohibit the trial of foreign 
terrorists in civilian courts108—a practice that republicans seemed happier to live 
with under George W. Bush.109
 and the third is insularity. From inside the administration, the philosophical 
distance between it and its predecessor, even when similar decisions are made, may 
106. nixon v. admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977).
107. Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
108. E.g., Ike Skelton national Defense authorization act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. no. 111-383, 124 
Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011) (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to transfer Guantánamo detainees to 
the United States); naftali Bendavid & Jess Bravin, Republicans Step Up Protests of Civilian Terror Trials, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 2010, at a5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487037625
04575037550051072986.html.
109. On the number of terrorism-related convictions in civilian court under President Bush, see Letter from 
Sen. ronald Weich, asst. att’y Gen., to Sen. Leahy & Sessions (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/terrorism-crimes-letter.html (“319 convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or 
terrorism-related cases arising from investigations conducted primarily after September 11, 2001 . . . . ” 
(quoting Dep’t of Justice, FY2009 Budget and Performance Summary pt.1, at 1, http://www.
justice.gov/jmd/2009summary/pdf/fy2009-bud-sum.pdf)). 
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not look at all obscure. President Obama’s May 2009 speech really did seem to signal 
a philosophical departure; as long as he sits in the Oval Office, the message still 
seems to be there—for administration insiders. the administration has also enjoyed, 
and in many cases continues to enjoy, the legal counsel of some of the most thoughtful 
progressive lawyers one could imagine—people like David Barron,110 harold Koh,111 
neal Katyal,112 Martin Lederman,113 and even the President and attorney General 
holder themselves. With lawyers of such progressive credentials involved in the 
administration’s decisionmaking—as compared to, say, David addington,114 Jay 
Bybee,115 alberto Gonzales,116 or John Yoo117—it may seem unthinkable to insiders 
110. harvard Law professor David Barron served in the Justice Department’s OLC from 2009–2010, 
including a stint as acting assistant attorney general. Barron appointed Prinicpal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, harv. L. Sch. (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/2009/01/20_barron.html. With professor Martin Lederman, he wrote The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, a devastating critique of the 
Bush administration’s position that the President, as Commander in Chief, acts outside Congress’s 
permissible regulatory scope. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 harv. L. rev. 689 
(2008).
111. harold Koh, legal advisor to the Department of State, served in the Clinton administration as assistant 
secretary of state for Democracy, human rights and Labor. his biography on the website of Yale Law 
School, where he served as dean from 2005 –2009, indicates he has won “more than thirty awards for his 
human rights work.” Harold Hongju Koh, Yale L. Sch., http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/hKoh.htm 
(last visited May 31, 2011).
112. neal Katyal, acting solicitor general of the United States, was lead counsel for the petitioner in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006); See neal K. Katyal, Geo. L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/
facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=Faculty&ID=272 (last visited May 31, 2011).
113. Georgetown law professor Martin Lederman was deputy assistant attorney general in the OLC from 
2009–2010, and co-authored The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, 
and Original Understanding. Barron & Lederman, supra note 110; Martin S. Lederman, Geo. L., http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=Faculty&ID=2134 (last visited May 
31, 2011).
114. as counsel and then chief of staff to former vice president Dick Cheney, David addington was “by far 
the most important member of the [Bush administration’s] legal team when it came to orchestrating its 
presidential-power agenda.” Charlie Savage, takeover: the return of the Imperial Presidency 
and the Subversion of american Democracy 83 (2007).
115. as assistant attorney general in charge of the OLC, Jay Bybee signed memoranda arguing the 
inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions to al-Qaeda and taliban detainees, along with memoranda 
approving harsh interrogation techniques and the use of military commissions. the torture Papers, 
supra note 9, at 81, 136, 144, 172.
116. as White house counsel, alberto Gonzales instructed his legal team “to be vigilant about seizing any 
opportunity to expand presidential power.” Savage, supra note 114, at 73. he also presided over meetings 
that led to the purported legal justification of harsh interrogations for CIa detainees. Id. at 154–55. In 
March 2004, he participated in a notorious late-night visit to the hospitalized then attorney general 
John ashcroft to elicit his reversal of then acting attorney general James Comey’s refusal to approve the 
terrorist Surveillance Program in its then current form. See harold h. Bruff, Bad advice: Bush’s 
Lawyers in the War on terror 153 (2009).
117. In the weeks immediately following September 11, the then deputy assistant attorney general in charge 
of the OLC, John Yoo, wrote a confidential analysis of the President’s war powers that formed the 
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that anyone could mistake their views of the presidency or the rule of law for the 
views of the Bush administration. Of course, except for the President, these names 
are all but unknown to the general public, and the fact of their availability for public 
service during the Obama administration is unlikely by itself to lay any kind of 
groundwork for a re-imagination of the presidency.
 It is understandable, based on these reasons, why the Obama administration 
might seem especially hesitant, perhaps even afraid, to mount a full-throated 
campaign for a view of the presidency that differs from Bush-Cheney presidentialism. 
But it is a critical project to undertake. I have previously argued in some detail that 
the Bush-Cheney view of the presidency is harmful to governance.118 It makes the 
bureaucracy less accountable.119 It leads to bad, sometimes unlawful, decisionmaking. 
It creates an organizational ethos of entitlement that undermines conscientious 
government lawyering. What makes full-throated resistance to presidentialism so 
critical, moreover, is that we are living in a moment when contemporary american 
culture seemingly has no room for an account of the presidency that is not 
fundamentally hierarchical and unaccountable.
 In discussing his own presidency, George W. Bush and his supporters were fond 
of connecting to two images—that of the corporate CeO120 and that of the 
Commander in Chief.121 With regard to the latter, it seemed to be all but forgotten 
that the constitutional job title is “Commander in Chief,” not of the government, but 
“of the army and navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States, 
when called into the actual Service of the United States.”122 Indeed, perhaps the most 
obvious textual refutation of the argument that the article II Vesting Clause123 
demands a “unitary presidency” is that such a reading of the presidency would make 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause superfluous.
 Free-market business values have become so hegemonic in our public discourse, 
however, that it is truly the conflation of the constitutional chief executive with the 
corporate CeO that is most dangerous. I have long been puzzled by conservative 
voters’ seeming approbation of the imperial presidency because such a presidency is 
analytic framework for much of OLC’s lawyering regarding the War on terror, and helped write even 
those memos on interrogation techniques and the Geneva Conventions that appeared over Jay Bybee’s 
signature. See Savage, supra note 114, at 79; the torture Papers, supra note 9, at 3, 38, 218. even the 
Margolis Memo explaining the decision not to pursue disciplinary action against professor Yoo called 
that memo “decidedly one-sided and conclusory.” Margolis Memo, supra note 90, at 45.
118. See generally Shane, supra note 3.
119. Id. at 158–67; heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 Minn. L. rev. 1741, 1744 (2009).
120. See James Carney & John F. Dickerson, Inside the Mind of the CEO President, time (Jul. 28, 2002), 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,331981,00.html.
121. See Interview by Brit hume with the President and Former President Bush, D.C. (Fox news broadcast 
Jan. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 57564, at *1 (“I’m going to miss being the Commander-in-Chief of the 
military. earlier the past week I had the honor of having a military parade that said goodbye to the 
Commander-in-Chief and it was an emotional moment for me and Laura.”).
122. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
123. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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hardly associated with either smaller government or libertarian values. Yet, accepting 
the President as our national CeO seemingly drapes the President in the imagined 
virtues of the private sector. the metaphor also helps excuse the President’s resistance 
to being accountable to anyone but his base; CeO’s, after all, are ultimately beholden 
to their shareholders. When someone like former U.n. ambassador John Bolton says, 
“the President has a responsibility to be true to the people who voted for 
him . . . . Otherwise, what’s the point of having elections?”124 he is utterly mistaking 
marketplace accountability for a President’s fiduciary accountability to the nation as 
a whole.
 Jack Goldsmith, in his memoir of public service during the Bush administration, 
bemoans that administration’s presidentialist dogmatism, but states: “It is not right to 
say, as some have done, that [Vice President Cheney and his chief of staff, David 
addington] took advantage of the 9/11 attacks to implement a radical pro-President 
agenda.”125 With respect, I think history will point to a different conclusion.126 
Indeed, the Bush-Cheney success in just that agenda, which exploited 9/11 
shamelesslessly, may now well make it appear politically perilous to pursue a different 
conception with any vigor. Unless such an effort is made, however, no clear alternative 
narrative of the presidency is going to become available—either to those who wield 
executive power or to those who would hold our Presidents accountable.
V. CONCLUSION
 In mid-February 2011, when popular protests erupted in Libya against the 
autocratic rule of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Qadhafi answered with violence, 
opening fire on unarmed crowds.127 there followed a series of retaliatory diplomatic 
responses, involving the United States, the United nations, the african Union, and 
other nations and international bodies.128 When Qadhafi intensified his campaign of 
violent suppression, the U.n. Security Council adopted resolution 1973, demanding 
an immediate ceasefire in Libya and authorizing member states to engage in the use 
of all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians.129 two days later, the United 
States commenced military operations to enforce resolution 1973, launching strikes 
against Qadhafi’s air defense systems and military airfields in order to lay the 
124. Interview by Jon Stewart with John Bolton, The Daily Show (Comedy Central television broadcast Mar. 
20, 2007), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-march-20-2007/john-bolton.
125. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 89.
126. See generally Savage, supra note 114.
127. David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Qaddafi Forces Violently Quell Capital Protest, n.Y. times, Feb. 
26, 2011, at a1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/africa/26libya.html. 
128. See Memorandum Op. from Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the att’y Gen. (apr. 1, 
2011), 2011 WL 1459998, at *1 –3 [hereinafter OLC Libya Opinion], http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/
authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
129. S.C. res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.n. Doc. S/reS/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UnDOC/Gen/n11/268/39/PDF/n1126839.pdf?Openelement.
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groundwork for a no-fly zone over Libya.130 On March 21, 2011, President Obama 
formally reported these events to congressional leadership “consistent with the War 
Powers resolution” (WPr).131 although the President did not cite the section of the 
WPr to which he was referring, it was presumably section 4, which through the 
operation of subsection 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress within 
forty-eight hours “in any case in which United States armed Forces are introduced 
[without a prior declaration of war]—into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”132 On 
april 1, 2011, the Justice Department’s OLC issued an opinion memorializing its 
advice that the President had acted within his constitutional authority to undertake 
such a military initiative without explicit congressional authorization.133 It based this 
conclusion on the weightiness of the U.S. national interests involved and the 
contextual facts indicating that the military’s efforts would be “limited in their 
nature, scope, and duration.”134 OLC explicitly cited the WPr as implicitly 
recognizing presidential authority of this scope.135
 From the standpoint of separation of powers law and practice, these events seem 
wholly conventional. Section 5(b) of the WPr, however, requires the President—
within sixty days of his report to Congress—to withdraw armed forces from any 
engagement in which he was required to report under section 4(a)(1).136 the sixty-
day rule would be inapplicable only if Congress had—since the President’s 
report—explicitly authorized the President’s continuing action, or “if the President 
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military 
necessity respecting the safety of United States armed Forces requires the continued 
use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such 
forces.”137 In the latter case, the WPr gives the President up to thirty additional days 
to withdraw.138 the administration’s legal posture went from conventional to totally 
obscure when the sixty-day limit—which ran on May 20, 2011—came and went 
without any further report to Congress, any request for or grant of explicit authority, 
or any certification that the President needed an additional thirty days to effectuate 
a safe withdrawal. the only articulation of the administration’s legal position came 
130. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the house of representatives & the President Pro tempore 
of the Senate (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/
letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya.
131. Id.
132. Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 –56, § 4(a)(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (2006)).
133. OLC Libya Opinion, supra note 128, at *1.
134. Id. at *13–14.
135. Id. at *8. 
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from White house Press Secretary Jay Carney, who said on May 20, “We believe the 
President has acted in a way that’s consistent with the War Powers resolution.”139
 Matters thus stood until, under congressional pressure, the White house released 
a report140 on June 15, 2011, with the heading, “United States activities in Libya.”141 
that report—which bears no letterhead, no date, and no signature—offers a one-
paragraph conclusory statement of the administration’s position on applying the 
sixty-day rule to its Libya campaign:
Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military operations in 
Libya and the limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions, 
the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief 
executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited 
military operations abroad. the President is of the view that the current U.S. 
military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers resolution 
and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because 
U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated 
by the resolution’s 60 day termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a 
constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition, whose operations 
are both legitimated by and limited to the terms of a United nations Security 
Council resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a 
no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not involve sustained 
fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the 
presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or 
any significant chance of escalation into a conf lict characterized by those 
factors.142
In other words, the administration deems section 5 of the WPr inapplicable 
because—given a series of what seem to be seven or eight limiting factors (none 
singled out as weightier or more critical than the others)—the campaign that the 
United States launched on March 19, 2011, was transformed into something less 
than “hostilities” before the expiration of sixty days.
 there is, as it happens, no authoritative source of interpretation that provides an 
irrefutable analysis confirming or rebuffing the administration’s interpretation of 
“hostilities.” It ought to be observed, however, that, compared to earlier instances in 
which Presidents urged what might be called the “sub-hostilities theory,” the Libya 
139. Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/20/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-5202011.
140. Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation, n.Y. 
times, June 16, 2011, at a16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.
html (describing both the release of the report and congressional pressure on the White house).
141. White house admin., United States activities in Libya (2011) [hereinafter White house 
Libya report], http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/204680/united-states-activities-in-libya- 
6-15-11.pdf. 
142. Id. at 25.
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campaign is offensive, sustained, and continuous.143 Moreover, U.S. military personnel 
continued flying sorties over Libya even after the transfer of command responsibility 
to natO.144 there is an obviously steep uphill climb for any legal argument that 
U.S. military involvement in the ongoing use of lethal force against an adversary who 
did not attack the United States falls short of what the WPr calls “hostilities.”
 What is just as confounding as the administration’s legal argument, however, is 
its overall management of the legal issues. although getting congressional support 
for a joint resolution in support of resolution 1973 might have proved challenging, it 
probably could have been accomplished had the President sought such a resolution at 
the time of his initial report to Congress. If the administration wanted to argue that 
the april 4 transition of military operations to natO ended U.S. involvement in 
“hostilities”—as the word is used in the WPr—it should have said so on april 4. It 
should certainly have said so prior to the May 20 expiration of the sixty days that 
passed after the President’s initial report to Congress. Instead, without even the 
cover of congressional appropriations to ratify the Libyan engagement, the President 
found himself, as of mid-June 2011, still resting his Libyan initiative entirely on 
inherent constitutional power to unilaterally undertake military operations “limited 
in nature, scope, and duration.” this seems fairly problematic given that the natO 
mandate, as of this writing, has already been extended to September 30, 2011,145 at 
which point the project will have lasted more than six months. Libya 2011, for war 
powers purposes, is not Grenada 1983.146
 as america’s global military strategy begins to rely ever more heavily on 
unmanned drones, off-shore missiles, and perhaps other remotely deployed weapons 
systems, there is reason to fear that the Libya episode could live on as a precedent 
very substantially undermining executive accountability to Congress for military 
action. as this essay goes to press, it appears as if the administration has simply 
squandered an obvious opportunity to combine a humanitarian mission abroad with 
a compelling new narrative on the role of the presidency—a narrative based on rule 
of law, checks and balances, and genuine public accountability. this would have only 
required going to Congress. the narrative I am imagining might variously be called, 
“the Checks and Balances Presidency,” “the Constitutionalist Presidency,” “the 
accountable Presidency,” “the rule of Law Presidency,” or perhaps simply, “the 
Democratic Presidency.” I like “democratic” the best because it captures the ideals of 
143. Jack Goldsmith, Problems with the Obama Administration’s War Powers Resolution Theory, Lawfare (June 
16, 2011, 8:38 aM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/problems-with-the-obama-administration’s-
war-powers-resolution-theory-2/.
144. Charlie Savage & thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya Followed Handoff to NATO, n.Y. times, 
June 21, 2011, at a8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/africa/21powers.html?_
r=1&scp=4&sq=libya&st=cse.
145. See White house Libya report, supra note 141, at 11.
146. Bernard Gwertzman, Grenada Fighting is Ended, U.S. Says; Mop-Up Continues, n.Y. times, nov. 3, 
1983, at a1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/03/world/grenada-fighting-is-ended-us-
says-mop-up-continues.html (reporting Defense Department statement that hostilities had ceased as of 
november 2, 1983, following the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983).
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presidential accountability to law as embodied in our Constitution or as enacted by 
Congress through our democratic legislative process and of day-to-day presidential 
accountability to attend to the interests of all of the american people, not just an 
electoral base.
 In elaborating on that ideal, President Obama would do well to go back to his 
own words of May 2009 and give them clearer—and repeated—specification:
We uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but 
because it strengthens our country and it keeps us safe. time and again, our 
values have been our best national security asset—in war and peace; in times 
of ease and in eras of upheaval . . . .
[regarding Guantánamo,] [t]he courts have spoken . . . . I cannot ignore 
these rulings because as President, I too am bound by the law. the United 
States is a nation of laws and so we must abide by these rulings . . . .
I ran for President promising transparency, and I meant what I said. and 
that’s why, whenever possible, my administration will make all information 
available to the american people so that they can make informed judgments 
and hold us accountable . . . . Whenever we cannot release certain information 
to the public for valid national security reasons, I will insist that there is 
oversight of my actions by Congress or by the courts . . . .
We seek the strongest and most sustainable legal framework for addressing 
[national security] issues in the long term—not to serve immediate politics, 
but to do what’s right over the long term. By doing that we can leave behind a 
legacy that outlasts my administration, my presidency, that endures for the 
next President and the President after that—a legacy that protects the 
american people and enjoys a broad legitimacy at home and abroad.147
there is nothing impractical about this view of the presidency, but for such a view to 
endure as a potent counter-narrative to Bush-Cheney presidentialism, the Obama 
administration must consistently test its actions according to these standards—and 
either defend its actions within a Democratic Presidency framework or revise those 
actions in deference to the rule of law and the system of accountability on which our 
nation depends. that project would truly do honor to the memory of September 11.
147. Obama nat’l Sec. remarks, supra note 7.
